Fighting a doctrine as though it were a state
How do you make war on an enemy that is not a country pursuing interests but an opinion gathering adherents? The coalition was fighting for fortresses and indemnities, and the memorial tells ministers that against this enemy captured ground buys nothing.
A century of European war had settled the form: take a fortress, extract an indemnity, trade a province at the peace. Against France in 1793 the form misses its target. What holds this enemy together is not a government whose calculations a defeat can alter but a doctrine that recruits, and territory taken from it is territory it can spare. Worse, every siege won that way hardens the thing being fought: no French party will rise for allies who plainly intend to keep Dunkirk. The war then ran exactly as the paper said it would.
- war and peace
- war and diplomacy
- foreign intervention
- balance of power
- international relations
- revolution
- civil war
- political prudence
Enter a dialogue
- The allies meant to leave France without colonies, fleet or frontier. Why did you warn that taking a nation's security buys a century of war?
- You advised the allies, amid defeats, to stay silent. Why does a threat made from weakness hurt its maker more than silence?
- An adversary whose strength is a conviction rather than a position cannot be beaten by taking what they hold. What is left to attack?
- Fortresses and indemnities had settled European wars for a century. Why should ministers accept that against revolutionary France the whole practice is worthless?
- How does one tell an enemy that is a state pursuing interests from one that is an opinion gathering adherents, before deciding how to fight?