Fighting a doctrine as though it were a state
How do you make war on an enemy that is not a country pursuing interests but an opinion gathering adherents? The coalition was fighting for fortresses and indemnities, and the memorial tells ministers that against this enemy captured ground buys nothing.
A century of European war had settled the form: take a fortress, extract an indemnity, trade a province at the peace. Against France in 1793 the form misses its target. What holds this enemy together is not a government whose calculations a defeat can alter but a doctrine that recruits, and territory taken from it is territory it can spare. Worse, every siege won that way hardens the thing being fought: no French party will rise for allies who plainly intend to keep Dunkirk. The war then ran exactly as the paper said it would.
- war and peace
- war and diplomacy
- foreign intervention
- balance of power
- international relations
- revolution
- civil war
- political prudence
Enter a dialogue
- An adversary whose strength is a conviction rather than a position cannot be beaten by taking what they hold. What is left to attack?
- Fortresses and indemnities had settled European wars for a century. Why should ministers accept that one enemy makes the whole practice worthless?
- How does one tell an enemy that is a state pursuing interests from one that is an opinion gathering adherents, before the war is chosen?
- Renouncing Dunkirk and every other conquest is what this argument demands of the allies. What does a coalition have to be, to pay that?
- Every siege won hardens the thing being fought, you argue. Then what military success is available at all against a doctrine?