WorkPlato

Cratylus

Are the names of things right by nature, or only by agreement? Plato's one dialogue devoted wholly to language stages the quarrel and refuses to settle it.

by Plato553 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
  • Greek, a translation held here
Original title
Κρατύλος
First published
380 BCE(aged 48)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

Do words fit the things they name by nature, or only because we have agreed that they will? That question — the oldest in the philosophy of language — is the whole business of the Cratylus, the only dialogue Plato gave over entirely to it. Hermogenes holds that names are pure convention, swappable at will; Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus and, tradition has it, one of Plato's own early teachers, holds that a true name mirrors its object by nature. Socrates plays the two off against each other, first spinning out a long, half-serious cascade of etymologies to show how names might encode the natures of things, then turning to puncture the whole naturalist programme. If names were built to capture a world in flux, he suggests at the end, they may be poor guides to a reality that does not flow — and in any case one should study things directly, not through their words. Nothing is concluded. The dialogue's blend of playful derivation and serious theory has kept it a working text for grammarians and philosophers of language from the Stoics onward. It comes down whole with the corpus, the strangest and most sustained reckoning with words that Plato left.

Key concepts

Who are Hermogenes and Cratylus, and what does each hold?

The two interlocutors embody the opposing theories of names. Hermogenes holds that names are pure convention, agreed on and swappable at will. Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus and, tradition says, one of Plato's own early teachers, holds that a true name mirrors its object by nature. Socrates plays the two positions against each other without endorsing either.

What is the 'name-giver', and the idea of a name as a tool?

Socrates argues a name is an instrument for teaching and distinguishing things, like a shuttle or a drill, made well or badly by a craftsman he calls the name-giver (nomothetes). On this picture not just any sound will do: a name can fit its object better or worse. It is his attempt at a middle path between raw convention and pure nature.

How does Heraclitus and flux enter the argument?

Cratylus follows Heraclitus, for whom all things flow and nothing stays fixed. Socrates suggests, near the end, that if names were built to capture such a flowing world, they may be poor guides to a reality that does not actually flux, and that one should study things directly rather than through their words. Language and metaphysics turn out entangled.

Where does the Cratylus stand in the philosophy of language?

It is Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names, and the oldest sustained treatment of the nature-versus-convention question. Nothing is concluded, but the puzzles it stages became working material for grammarians and philosophers from the Stoics onward. The debate it opened, how words relate to what they name, has never been closed.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Do Names Fit by Nature or Agreement?

The oldest question in the philosophy of language: does a true name mirror the thing it names, or bind to it only because we agreed it would?

Hermogenes holds names pure convention, swappable at will; Cratylus, a Heraclitean, holds a true name mirrors its object by nature. Socrates plays them off — first spinning a half-serious cascade of etymologies to show how names might encode natures, then puncturing the whole naturalist programme. If names were built to capture a world in flux, he suggests, they may poorly guide a reality that does not flow; better to study things directly than through their words. Nothing is concluded, and the debate it opened has never closed.

  • language
  • truth
  • semantics
  • etymology
  • metaphysics
  • meaning
  • naming
  • communication
  • linguistics
  • representation
  • essence
  • convention
  • philosophy of language
  • nature
  • mimesis

Within this work

passages held
553
distinct concepts
371
by passages held, corpus-wide
#54

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: language with truth.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 24 pairings. 1,113 shared passages in all. 76 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
languagetruth164
languagesemantics152
etymologylanguage105
semanticstruth79
languagemeaning70
languagenaming67
communicationlanguage56
languagemetaphysics43
namingtruth34
etymologysemantics32
communicationtruth31
namingsemantics31
etymologymeaning29
etymologymetaphysics28
etymologytruth28
metaphysicstruth28
communicationmeaning25
communicationsemantics25
meaningtruth25
meaningsemantics16
metaphysicssemantics16
etymologynaming15
communicationetymology7
metaphysicsnaming7

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος) you are here GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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