Do Names Fit by Nature or Agreement?
The oldest question in the philosophy of language: does a true name mirror the thing it names, or bind to it only because we agreed it would?
Hermogenes holds names pure convention, swappable at will; Cratylus, a Heraclitean, holds a true name mirrors its object by nature. Socrates plays them off — first spinning a half-serious cascade of etymologies to show how names might encode natures, then puncturing the whole naturalist programme. If names were built to capture a world in flux, he suggests, they may poorly guide a reality that does not flow; better to study things directly than through their words. Nothing is concluded, and the debate it opened has never closed.
- language
- truth
- semantics
- etymology
- metaphysics
- meaning
- naming
- communication
- linguistics
- representation
- essence
- convention
- philosophy of language
- nature
- mimesis
Enter a dialogue
- Can you tell a name that mirrors its object by nature from one that binds only because we agreed?
- Hermogenes says names are pure convention, swappable at will. What is wrong with simply renaming things as we please?
- When someone wants to understand a thing, should he study its name or turn from the word to the thing itself?
- If names were built to capture a world in flux, what must we give up trusting them to tell us?
- You spin out a cascade of etymologies to show names encode natures, then puncture the whole idea. Were you ever serious?