Do Names Fit by Nature or Agreement?
The oldest question in the philosophy of language: does a true name mirror the thing it names, or bind to it only because we agreed it would?
Hermogenes holds names pure convention, swappable at will; Cratylus, a Heraclitean, holds a true name mirrors its object by nature. Socrates plays them off — first spinning a half-serious cascade of etymologies to show how names might encode natures, then puncturing the whole naturalist programme. If names were built to capture a world in flux, he suggests, they may poorly guide a reality that does not flow; better to study things directly than through their words. Nothing is concluded, and the debate it opened has never closed.
- language
- truth
- semantics
- etymology
- meaning
- naming
- communication
- linguistics
- representation
- essence
- convention
- philosophy of language
- nature
- mimesis
- knowledge
Enter a dialogue
- Your Socrates calls a name a tool, like a weaver's shuttle. What does a well-made name do that a badly made one cannot?
- Hermogenes, the speaker who defends convention, says any name can be swapped for another at will. What is wrong with simply renaming things as we please?
- Followers of Heraclitus say no one steps into the same river twice. If everything keeps changing, can any name, or any knowledge, hold still?
- Only a rare craftsman, the name-giver, can make names, your Socrates says. If things are known only through names, how did the first name-giver know anything?
- An exact copy of a man, feature for feature, would be a second man, not a likeness. Why must a true name fall short of its object?