WorkPlato

Gorgias

Is it better to suffer wrong than to do it? Socrates says yes — against an Athenian who insists the strong should simply take what they can.

by Plato139 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Γοργίας
First published
380 BCE(aged 48)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

Late in this long and angry dialogue a young Athenian named Callicles states a creed that has never quite gone away: that conventional justice is a fraud invented by the weak to hobble the strong, and that the superior man should follow nature and seize what he can. He is the last and fiercest of three opponents — after the celebrated rhetorician Gorgias and his brash pupil Polus — and the argument builds its way toward him. Socrates presses claims that scandalise all three: that rhetoric is no genuine art but mere flattery, a knack for pleasing crowds; that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it; and that the tyrant who kills and plunders unpunished is not enviable but the most wretched of men, because he has wrecked his own soul. Behind the clash sits a matter of life and death, since the man saying these things would himself be condemned by an Athenian jury. Composed around 380 BCE, the Gorgias is the hinge where Plato turns from Socratic ethics toward the political vision of the Republic, and Callicles' challenge — why be just, if injustice pays? — is exactly the one the Republic is built to answer. It survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

Who are Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles?

Socrates' three successive opponents, and the argument escalates through them. Gorgias is the celebrated rhetorician; Polus is his brash young pupil; Callicles is the last and fiercest, an Athenian who preaches natural right. Each takes over as the previous one is cornered, so the dialogue builds from a polite dispute about rhetoric to a raw clash over how to live.

What is the physis-versus-nomos distinction Callicles uses?

Callicles opposes nomos, man-made convention, to physis, nature. Conventional justice, he says, is a fraud the weak majority invents to cage the strong, while nature's own justice entitles the superior man to take and hold more. The nomos and physis contrast is the frame for his whole creed, so Socrates must dismantle that framework, not just its conclusion.

Who was Gorgias historically, since Callicles dominates the end?

Gorgias was a real and famous Sicilian rhetorician who visited Athens and taught the art of persuasion for high fees. The dialogue is named for him, though he yields early and the fictional Callicles carries its fiercest argument. Naming it Gorgias marks the target: the profession of rhetoric itself, of which Gorgias was the age's most eminent representative.

How does the Gorgias set up the Republic?

It is the hinge where Plato turns from Socratic ethics toward the political vision of the Republic. Callicles' challenge, why be just if injustice pays, is precisely the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering. Composed around 380 BCE, the Gorgias frames the problem in its rawest form before Plato builds the long reply.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Rhetoric, Flattery, and Power

Is the orator's craft a genuine art or a knack for pleasing crowds — and does the power it wins over a city amount to anything worth having?

Against Gorgias and his brash pupil Polus, Socrates denies that rhetoric is an art at all: it is flattery, a knack for gratifying audiences as cookery gratifies the body, indifferent to their good. The power it confers — even a tyrant's freedom to kill and plunder — is not enviable but wretched, since it wrecks the doer's own soul. What looks like mastery of the city is servitude to its appetites, and political power becomes a question about the soul that wields it.

  • rhetoric
  • power
  • persuasion
  • flattery
  • politics
  • leadership
  • expertise
  • knowledge

Better to Suffer Wrong Than Do It

Callicles insists conventional justice is a fraud the weak invented to cage the strong. Is the just life truly the good one — or does injustice pay?

The fiercest of the three opponents, Callicles preaches that the superior man should follow nature and seize what he can. Socrates answers with claims that scandalise the room: it is better to suffer wrong than to do it, and the unpunished wrongdoer is the most wretched of men because his soul is diseased. Punishment, on this view, heals. Behind it sits Socrates' own coming trial, and Callicles' challenge — why be just, if injustice pays? — is exactly the question the Republic is built to answer.

  • ethics
  • justice
  • virtue
  • truth
  • pleasure
  • happiness
  • soul
  • desire
  • temperance
  • injustice
  • punishment
  • dialectic

Within this work

passages held
139
distinct concepts
202
by passages held, corpus-wide
#161

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: ethics with rhetoric.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 18 pairings. 87 shared passages in all. 77 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
ethicsrhetoric13
ethicsjustice11
ethicslogic8
justicerhetoric8
definitionrhetoric5
epistemologyrhetoric5
ethicsvirtue5
definitionlogic4
justicevirtue4
logicrhetoric4
epistemologyethics3
justicelogic3
justicepower3
rhetoricvirtue3
epistemologyjustice2
epistemologylogic2
ethicspower2
powerrhetoric2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας) you are here GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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