WorkPlato

Theaetetus

What is knowledge? Three answers are tested and all three fail — in a dialogue that ends, deliberately, with nothing settled.

by Plato664 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
  • Greek, a translation held here
Original title
Θεαίτητος
First published
369 BCE(aged 59)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

The dialogue is framed as a tribute. Theaetetus, a gifted young mathematician, is being carried home dying of wounds and fever, and his old teacher has a written record of a conversation the boy once had with Socrates, which is read aloud. Its subject is the plainest and hardest question in philosophy: what is knowledge? Theaetetus offers three answers, and Socrates — calling himself a midwife who helps other minds give birth to their thoughts — tests each to destruction. Knowledge is perception, the first says; but that collapses into Protagoras' claim that each man is the measure of all things, which Socrates takes apart. Knowledge is true judgement, says the second; but a jury can be talked into a true verdict without knowing anything. Knowledge is true judgement plus an account, says the third; but every attempt to say what an 'account' adds runs in a circle. The dialogue ends in open failure — a model of honest aporia — having cleared away wrong answers without reaching a right one. Its third definition is the distant ancestor of the modern 'justified true belief' analysis and the Gettier problems that trouble it. Belonging to Plato's late period and tied forward to the Sophist and Statesman, it survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

What three definitions of knowledge does the dialogue test?

Theaetetus offers three in turn: knowledge is perception; knowledge is true judgement; and knowledge is true judgement plus an account (logos). Socrates refutes each — perception collapses into relativism, true judgement fails because one can be persuaded into a correct verdict without knowing, and every sense of "account" runs in a circle. The three form the dialogue's whole architecture.

What is the "secret doctrine" behind perception-as-knowledge?

To prop up the first definition Socrates fuses Protagoras with Heraclitus: if man is the measure, and if all things are always in flux, then perceiver and perceived arise together in each fleeting encounter, and every perception is true for its perceiver. Knowledge would be nothing but private appearance. Socrates builds this "secret doctrine" out fully precisely so he can dismantle it.

How does Socrates turn Protagoras against himself?

By the peritropē, the "table-turning." If every opinion is true for the one who holds it, then the opinion of the many that Protagoras is wrong is itself true — so by his own rule his doctrine is false. Relativism, made fully consistent, refutes itself. It cannot even claim to be more true than its own denial.

What are the wax tablet and the aviary?

Two models Socrates builds to explain how false judgement is even possible. The wax tablet is memory: we err by fitting a fresh perception to the wrong stored imprint. The aviary distinguishes possessing knowledge from actually holding it — birds we own in the cage but may seize the wrong one. Both attempts to locate error within judgement alone break down.

Why does adding an "account" (logos) not yield knowledge?

The third definition says knowledge is true judgement plus a logos. But every sense of "account" fails: as mere speech it adds nothing; as an enumeration of a thing's elements it can be had without knowledge; as stating the distinguishing mark it presupposes the very knowledge it was meant to supply. Each reading circles back on itself, and the inquiry ends unresolved.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

What Is Knowledge?

Three times the plainest and hardest question in philosophy is answered, and three times the answer fails — an inquiry that ends, deliberately, with nothing settled.

Theaetetus proposes that knowledge is perception, then true judgement, then true judgement plus an account; Socrates, calling himself a midwife who helps other minds give birth, tests each to destruction. Perception collapses into Protagoras' relativism — man the measure of all things — which he dismantles; true judgement fails because a jury can be talked into a correct verdict knowing nothing; the third runs in a circle. The dialogue ends in honest aporia, clearing wrong answers without reaching a right one. Its last definition is the distant ancestor of modern 'justified true belief' and the Gettier problems that trouble it.

  • knowledge
  • epistemology
  • truth
  • perception
  • definition
  • relativism
  • subjectivity
  • judgment
  • belief
  • cognition

Within this work

passages held
664
distinct concepts
442
by passages held, corpus-wide
#39

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: epistemology with perception.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 25 pairings. 927 shared passages in all. 75 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
epistemologyperception71
cognitionperception58
perceptionsubjectivity56
subjectivitytruth55
perceptiontruth53
epistemologytruth50
relativismtruth50
knowledgelogic47
relativismsubjectivity47
epistemologyknowledge44
cognitionepistemology43
logictruth39
perceptionrelativism37
knowledgetruth36
epistemologylogic35
knowledgeperception35
cognitiontruth29
cognitionknowledge28
epistemologysubjectivity26
logicperception18
cognitionlogic17
logicrelativism16
epistemologyrelativism14
logicsubjectivity12
knowledgesubjectivity11

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος) you are here GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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