Letting Not-Being Be
How can anyone even describe a liar if, as Parmenides ruled, 'what is not' cannot be spoken? Catching the sophist forces Plato to overturn his revered predecessor.
The Eleatic Stranger, not Socrates, leads what he calls a parricide: against Parmenides he argues that not-being is simply difference — one thing's not being another — woven through everything that is, which at last makes falsehood, and so the sophist's whole trade, sayable. The method of division cuts the concept downward branch by branch until the quarry is cornered, and an account of the 'greatest kinds' — being, sameness, difference, rest, motion — shows how they mix. It is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology, and it fed straight into Aristotle's.
- ontology
- logic
- metaphysics
- falsehood
- dialectic
- definition
- methodology
- classification
- sophistry
- being
Enter a dialogue
- A person keeps being fooled by a smooth talker who deals in false appearances — what in this hunt for the sophist helps them see through him?
- You call it parricide to overturn Parmenides and let not-being be — is difference really enough to rescue the very idea of a falsehood?
- To explain how anyone can speak what is false, you abandoned your predecessor's ruling that not-being cannot be — was that price worth paying?
- How is what is not, understood as one thing simply differing from another, different from the pure nothingness that cannot be spoken?
- Someone cannot tell a genuine seeker of truth from a clever imitator of one — does your method of division give them a way?