WorkPlato

Sophist

To catch the sophist in his lies, Plato commits 'parricide' — overturning his revered predecessor Parmenides to prove that not-being, in a sense, is.

by Plato91 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Σοφιστής
First published
360 BCE(aged 68)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

To pin down what a sophist actually is — a dealer in false appearances — Plato has to solve a problem his most revered predecessor had declared unsolvable. Parmenides had ruled that 'what is not' cannot be spoken or thought at all; but if telling a falsehood is saying what is not, then the sophist's whole trade is impossible even to describe until not-being is somehow let into reality. The lead here is not Socrates, who mostly listens, but a visitor from Elea — Parmenides' own philosophical home — and the Stranger calls what he must do a kind of parricide: he overturns the father of Eleatic philosophy to show that not-being is really just difference, one thing's not being another, threaded through everything that is. Around this runs the method of division, cutting a concept downward branch by branch until the sophist is cornered, and an account of the 'greatest kinds' — being, sameness, difference, rest and motion — and how they mix. A late work, the middle panel of the sequence from the Theaetetus to the Statesman, the Sophist holds Plato's most technical logic and his hardest thinking about being, and it fed straight into Aristotle's. It survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

What are the five "greatest kinds"?

Being, sameness, difference, rest, and motion — the megista genē, the most pervasive kinds running through all discourse. The Stranger studies how they blend: motion and rest never mix, yet each combines with being, sameness, and difference. Above all, difference pervades everything, so every kind both is itself and is not the others. This blending is the machinery that makes not-being respectable.

What is the method of division, and the angler paradigm?

Division (diairesis) defines a thing by cutting a broad kind in two, again and again, following one branch down to the target. The Stranger first practises on a humble example — the angler — to fix the method, then turns it on the sophist, who is caught in seven successive definitions. The technique makes defining a systematic descent rather than a guess.

What is the battle of gods and giants over being?

The Stranger stages a Gigantomachia: materialists ("giants") who grant existence only to tangible bodies, against "friends of the Forms" who grant being only to changeless, bodiless realities. To settle it he proposes a mark of being — power (dynamis), the capacity to affect or be affected by anything at all. This admits both change and Forms into what is, against both camps.

How does image-making split, and why does it matter?

The Stranger divides image-making into likeness-making, which copies true proportions, and appearance-making, which distorts them to look right from the viewer's angle. The sophist hides in the second: he manufactures appearances of wisdom, not the reality. Cornering him there is what forces the whole problem of how a false appearance can be, since a false image is a thing that somehow is not.

What makes a statement false, once not-being is allowed?

A statement (logos) is the weaving of a name with a verb — "Theaetetus flies." It is true when it says of its subject the things that are, false when it says things that are different, that are not the case of him. So a lie has a real structure: a genuine subject joined to predicates that miss him, never the speaking of sheer nothing.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Letting Not-Being Be

How can anyone even describe a liar if, as Parmenides ruled, 'what is not' cannot be spoken? Catching the sophist forces Plato to overturn his revered predecessor.

The Eleatic Stranger, not Socrates, leads what he calls a parricide: against Parmenides he argues that not-being is simply difference — one thing's not being another — woven through everything that is, which at last makes falsehood, and so the sophist's whole trade, sayable. The method of division cuts the concept downward branch by branch until the quarry is cornered, and an account of the 'greatest kinds' — being, sameness, difference, rest, motion — shows how they mix. It is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology, and it fed straight into Aristotle's.

  • ontology
  • logic
  • metaphysics
  • falsehood
  • dialectic
  • definition
  • methodology
  • classification
  • sophistry
  • being

Within this work

passages held
91
distinct concepts
116
by passages held, corpus-wide
#189

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: logic with ontology.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 17 pairings. 74 shared passages in all. 53 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
logicontology10
languagelogic8
metaphysicsontology8
logicmetaphysics7
classificationmethodology6
languagemetaphysics5
languageontology5
dialecticmethodology4
classificationlogic3
dialecticmetaphysics3
logicmethodology3
classificationdialectic2
classificationsophistry2
dialecticlogic2
dialecticsophistry2
methodologysophistry2
ontologysophistry2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής) you are here GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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