Letting Not-Being Be
How can anyone even describe a liar if, as Parmenides ruled, 'what is not' cannot be spoken? Catching the sophist forces Plato to overturn his revered predecessor.
The Eleatic Stranger, not Socrates, leads what he calls a parricide: against Parmenides he argues that not-being is simply difference — one thing's not being another — woven through everything that is, which at last makes falsehood, and so the sophist's whole trade, sayable. The method of division cuts the concept downward branch by branch until the quarry is cornered, and an account of the 'greatest kinds' — being, sameness, difference, rest, motion — shows how they mix. It is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology, and it fed straight into Aristotle's.
- ontology
- logic
- metaphysics
- falsehood
- dialectic
- definition
- methodology
- classification
- sophistry
- being
Enter a dialogue
- Your visitor from Elea must attack Parmenides, the father of his school, who said what is not cannot be spoken. Why does hunting a sophist force that?
- Against Parmenides, your Eleatic Stranger says 'what is not' is only difference, one thing not being another. Has he solved the puzzle, or changed the subject from nothingness?
- Someone keeps falling for a smooth talker who sounds wise on everything and knows nothing. What in your Stranger's hunt for the sophist helps them see through him?
- Some insist a thing bears only its own name: a man is 'man', never 'good'. Why does your Eleatic Stranger say they contradict themselves whenever they speak?
- Your Eleatic Stranger says vowels run through all letters like a bond, so consonants cannot join without them. What does the same job for the things that exist?