WorkPlato

Republic

Plato's masterwork: what begins as a question about justice grows into an entire ideal city, ruled by philosophers, and the allegory of the cave.

by Plato420 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Πολιτεία
First published
375 BCE(aged 53)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

In a rich man's house down in the Piraeus, Socrates is asked a plain question — what is justice? — and the answer runs to the longest sustained argument Plato ever wrote. The fierce Thrasymachus cuts in to say justice is nothing but whatever serves the stronger; then Glaucon and Adeimantus press harder, demanding proof that the just life is better even for a man who could escape all consequences — the point of the tale of the ring of Gyges, which makes its wearer invisible. To answer, Socrates builds a city in words, reasoning that justice will be easier to read when written large. Out of that construction come the ideas the Republic is remembered for: the city and the soul each divided into three; the guardians and their stripped-down communal life; the rule of philosopher-kings; the banishing of the poets; and, at the heart of it, the allegory of the cave and the Form of the Good, toward which all genuine knowledge climbs. No other single work has done more to shape Western political and moral thought. Aristotle argued against its communism in the Politics; Cicero replied with a Roman Republic of his own; Thomas More's Utopia descends from it, as does nearly every later design for an ideal state. Since the nineteenth century it has been among Plato's most widely read dialogues, and it survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

How does the Republic define justice itself?

Justice is each part doing its own work and not meddling in another's — performing the single role one is fitted for. In the city, rulers rule, auxiliaries guard, producers produce; in the soul, reason rules, spirit assists, appetite obeys. Injustice is one part usurping another's task. The whole case turns on this structural definition, not on a list of just deeds.

What is the "city writ large" method?

Rather than defining justice in a person directly, Socrates builds a city in speech, reasoning that justice is easier to read where it is written larger, then reads it back into the soul. The city-soul analogy is the argument's engine, not decoration: the parallel between three classes and three soul-parts is what lets political order certify inner order.

What do the Sun and the Form of the Good stand for?

The Good is the highest Form, source of the being and knowability of all the others; Socrates can only gesture at it through the image of the Sun. As the sun gives sight its light and living things their growth, the Good gives the mind its truth and the Forms their reality. It is what philosopher-rulers must finally know — the terminus of the ascent.

What is the divided line?

A line cut into four segments ranking the mind's objects by clarity: images, then visible things, then mathematical objects reasoned from hypotheses, then the Forms grasped by pure dialectic. It maps two realms — visible and intelligible — onto four cognitive states, from illusion up to understanding. The cave dramatizes the same ascent the line diagrams.

What does each element of the cave allegory represent?

The prisoners are ordinary people taking shadows for reality; the shadows are the images and opinions of daily life; the fire is the visible sun; the climb out is education; the outer world is the Forms; and the sun above is the Good. The prisoner forced back in, mocked and endangered, figures the philosopher's duty to return and govern.

What is the "noble lie" and the myth of metals?

A founding falsehood told to bind the city: all citizens are born from the earth as brothers, but with gold, silver, or bronze mixed into their souls, fixing their class. Rulers carry gold, auxiliaries silver, producers bronze — though a child's metal may differ from its parents'. Plato defends it as a medicinal fiction securing loyalty and the rule of the fittest.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

What Justice Is

Is the just life better than the unjust even for a man who could get away with anything? The whole work is the answer to Glaucon's challenge.

Thrasymachus opens by declaring justice merely whatever serves the stronger, and Glaucon sharpens it with the ring of Gyges, which lets its wearer sin unseen. Against them Socrates refuses to defend justice by its rewards or its reputation, arguing it is a health of the soul worth having for its own sake. To read it he writes justice 'large' in a city — the move that grows a question of ethics and morality into the longest argument Plato wrote, grounding the answer in the ordering of character rather than in consequences.

  • justice
  • ethics
  • morality
  • character
  • knowledge

The Soul in Three Parts

If a person, like a city, is governed well only when the right part rules, what are the parts — and which should hold command?

Reason, spirit and appetite divide the soul as guardians, auxiliaries and producers divide the city, and justice in each is the same thing: every part doing its own work while reason rules. Appetite left ungoverned breeds the tyrant, the least happy of men for all his power. By mapping psychology onto politics Plato makes virtue a matter of inner order and self-mastery over desire, tying the health of a person to the health of a state — the analogy that carries the book's whole case for justice.

  • psychology
  • human nature
  • desire
  • rationality
  • self-control
  • wisdom
  • soul

The City Ruled by Philosophers

Who should rule, and how must they be formed? Only those who have climbed out of the cave to knowledge of the Good, Plato answers — and the design is uncompromising.

Guardians live stripped of property and family, the poets are banished, and rule falls to philosopher-kings trained by a long ascent toward the Form of the Good, dramatised in the allegory of the cave. Against Athenian democracy and its rhetoricians, Plato binds legitimate authority to knowledge rather than to consent or force. Aristotle attacked its communism, More's Utopia descended from it, and nearly every later blueprint for an ideal state answers this one — the fullest and most contested political vision in the corpus.

  • political philosophy
  • governance
  • leadership
  • education
  • authority
  • social order
  • tyranny
  • power
  • censorship
  • truth
  • virtue

Within this work

passages held
420
distinct concepts
523
by passages held, corpus-wide
#80

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: ethics with justice.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 11 pairings. 94 shared passages in all. 89 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
ethicsjustice21
epistemologymetaphysics12
ethicspsychology10
ethicsvirtue10
educationvirtue9
justicevirtue8
educationepistemology6
justicepolitical philosophy6
educationmetaphysics4
epistemologyethics4
psychologyvirtue4

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία) you are here GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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