WorkPlato

Philebus

Which makes a life good — pleasure or wisdom? Plato's late, difficult answer is that neither wins alone: the best life is a measured mixture.

by Plato496 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
  • Greek, a translation held here
Original title
Φίληβος
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

The argument is already underway when the dialogue opens: Philebus has been maintaining that pleasure is the good for every living thing, and when he tires of defending it the young Protarchus takes up the case against Socrates, who speaks for knowledge and intelligence. Rather than let either side win outright, Socrates argues that the best human life is a mixture of the two — but not an even one, for wisdom, measure and proportion rank far above pleasure in it, and pleasure is admitted only where it is true and pure rather than intense and shot through with pain. To sort this out he brings in one of his most abstract instruments, a division of everything that is into four: the unlimited, the limit, the mixture of the two, and the cause that does the mixing. The Philebus is generally placed among the late dialogues, though its exact position is genuinely uncertain and rests on thin evidence. Technical and often forbidding, it drew close study from the Neoplatonists and was especially prized by Ficino in the Renaissance. It is Plato's last and most careful treatment of pleasure and the good, and it survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

What is the fourfold division of everything that is?

To place pleasure and mind, Socrates sorts all things into four: the unlimited (apeiron), which admits more and less without bound, like hotter and colder; the limit (peras), which imposes definite ratio and number; the mixture of the two, where limit tames the unlimited into a stable, measured thing; and the cause that does the mixing. Pleasure belongs to the unlimited, the good life to the ordered mixture.

What is the "divine method" of one and many?

A procedure Socrates calls a gift of the gods: never leap from a single kind straight to the infinitely many, but find the definite number of forms lying in between. Pleasure and knowledge are each not one thing but many kinds, some good, some not — so neither can be judged whole. The method forces you to count the species before ruling on the class.

How does the dialogue define pleasure and pain?

Largely as restoration and disruption of a natural harmony. When a living thing is depleted — hungry, thirsty, cold — that is pain; the replenishing, the return to balance, is pleasure. On this account many pleasures are inseparable from a preceding lack and its ache, which is why the most intense are laced with pain. Only a few, like the pleasures of learning or of pure colour, arise from no prior distress.

In what sense can a pleasure be false?

Socrates argues pleasures can be false the way beliefs can. We take pleasure now in anticipated goods that never arrive, so the pleasure attaches to a falsehood. We also misjudge a pleasure's size by contrast with a present pain, as things look larger up close. Such pleasures misrepresent their object, so hedonism cannot treat every pleasure as an unquestionable good.

How does the dialogue finally rank the goods?

It closes with a graded list of what makes a life good. First comes measure and the timely; second proportion, beauty, completeness; third mind and intelligence; fourth the sciences, arts, and right opinion; and only fifth the pure, painless pleasures. The intense pleasures Philebus championed do not place at all. The good life is a mixture, but ordered from the top by measure, not by pleasure.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Pleasure, Wisdom, and the Good Life

Which makes a life good — pleasure or intelligence? Plato's late answer refuses both extremes: the best life is a measured mixture, with wisdom ranked above pleasure in it.

Against Philebus's claim that pleasure is the good for every living thing, Socrates speaks for knowledge and mind, then declines to let either side win: the best life blends the two, but unequally, since measure and proportion outrank pleasure, and only true, pure pleasures — not the intense ones shot through with pain — are admitted. To sort them he divides all that is into four: the unlimited, the limit, their mixture, and the cause that does the mixing. It is Plato's last and most careful ethics of pleasure, forbidding and technical, prized later by Ficino.

  • pleasure
  • wisdom
  • ethics
  • hedonism
  • value theory
  • pain
  • knowledge
  • rationality
  • classification

Within this work

passages held
496
distinct concepts
371
by passages held, corpus-wide
#68

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: ethics with pleasure.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 14 pairings. 265 shared passages in all. 86 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
ethicspleasure34
ethicswell-being34
pleasurewell-being34
hedonismwell-being29
logicmetaphysics27
ethicshedonism24
pleasurepsychology20
metaphysicspleasure13
metaphysicstruth10
pleasuretruth10
psychologywell-being9
hedonismpleasure8
logictruth7
ethicslogic6

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος) you are here GRCELEN
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