WorkPlato

Timaeus

For a thousand years the one dialogue the Latin West knew: Plato's account of how a divine craftsman shaped an ordered cosmos out of chaos.

by Plato115 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Τίμαιος
First published
360 BCE(aged 68)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

For most of the Middle Ages, western Europe knew Plato through this book and almost no other. A fourth-century scholar, Calcidius, put part of it into Latin with a commentary, and that fragment was for centuries the only Plato in the monastic libraries — which is why the Timaeus, of all the dialogues, shaped medieval cosmology and the twelfth-century thinkers of Chartres. The dialogue itself is largely a monologue. After Socrates and his friends meet again and Critias introduces the tale of Atlantis, the mathematician Timaeus of Locri delivers a long 'likely story' of how the universe was made: a divine craftsman, the demiurge, looking to the eternal Forms as his pattern, orders a disorderly chaos into a living cosmos with a World-Soul, working geometry into the very elements of matter by means of a receptacle that holds all becoming. It is Plato's only systematic natural philosophy, and it became a cornerstone of Neoplatonism and, through Calcidius, of Christian cosmology. Its long reach into later thought is arguably greater than any other dialogue's — Raphael set it in Plato's hand in The School of Athens. It survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

What is the Receptacle (chōra)?

A "third kind" besides the eternal Forms and their sensible copies: a formless matrix or space that receives all becoming, like gold shaped into figure after figure while staying gold. Having no character of its own, it can take on every character. Timaeus calls it the "nurse" of becoming — the medium in which the demiurge's geometry gets impressed on matter.

How is the World-Soul structured?

The demiurge blends being, sameness, and difference into a soul-stuff, divides it by harmonic and geometric ratios, and bends it into two revolving circles: the Same, carrying the fixed stars, and the Different, carrying the planets. This mathematical, musical structure is why the heavens move in ordered proportion, and why soul, spread through the whole, makes the cosmos one living, thinking animal.

What are the geometric elements, the Platonic solids?

Beneath the four elements lie two kinds of right triangle, from which the demiurge builds regular solids: fire is the tetrahedron, air the octahedron, water the icosahedron, earth the cube. Because fire, air, and water share the same triangles, they can transform into one another; earth cannot. Matter is geometry all the way down — the elements are shapes, not stuffs.

What are reason and necessity in the cosmos?

The world has two causes. Reason (nous), the demiurge's purpose, aims at the good; necessity (anankē), the "wandering cause," is the brute behaviour of materials. The cosmos is made by reason persuading necessity — order coaxed from resistant matter, never total. This is why the world is good but not perfect: teleology works with, not against, the given nature of things.

In what sense is time a "moving image of eternity"?

The eternal Forms simply are, timelessly; the cosmos, being a copy, cannot share that changeless eternity, so the demiurge makes time as its nearest likeness — a "moving image of eternity, proceeding according to number." The heavenly bodies are its instruments, marking days, months, and years. Time and the heavens come to be together; there is no time before the cosmos.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

How the Cosmos Was Made

Where does an ordered, living universe come from? A divine craftsman, looking to the eternal Forms, shapes it out of a disorderly chaos — Plato's one systematic natural philosophy.

Timaeus of Locri delivers a long 'likely story': the demiurge, gazing at the changeless Forms as his pattern, orders chaos into a living cosmos endowed with a World-Soul, working geometry into the very elements of matter through a receptacle that holds all becoming. Teleology governs throughout — the world is made good because made by reason. Through Calcidius's partial Latin translation this was for centuries the only Plato the West knew, shaping medieval and Neoplatonic cosmology; Raphael set it in Plato's hand in The School of Athens.

  • cosmology
  • metaphysics
  • teleology
  • order
  • creation
  • causality
  • natural philosophy
  • geometry
  • nature
  • elements

Within this work

passages held
115
distinct concepts
167
by passages held, corpus-wide
#174

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: metaphysics with ontology.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 8 pairings. 25 shared passages in all. 66 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
metaphysicsontology6
elementsphysics4
cosmologyphysics3
epistemologymetaphysics3
physiologyteleology3
cosmologyelements2
cosmologyteleology2
epistemologyontology2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος) you are here GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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