WorkPlato

Eryxias

A short dialogue on whether wealth is really a good — carried under Plato's name, but almost certainly not his.

by Plato24 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Ἐρυξίας
First published
350 BCE(aged 78)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

The question is whether wealth is genuinely good, and worth chasing. Socrates, with Eryxias, Critias and a young man named Erasistratus, works toward the paradoxical answer that money has only conventional value, and that the richest people, forever wanting more, may be the most wretched of all. It is a recognisably Socratic sort of conclusion, but the execution has convinced scholars that Plato did not write it. The Eryxias is classed among the spurious works — the group of dialogues transmitted under Plato's name yet judged not to be his — and doubts about it reach back into antiquity, where it was sometimes given to other hands. It comes down whole with the corpus all the same, one of the pieces that show how a famous philosopher's name gathers imitations around it. Of everything on this shelf, it is among the least likely to be Plato's at all.

Key concepts

Why is the Eryxias classed among the "spurious" works?

Because scholars judge it not written by Plato. It belongs to the nothoi — dialogues carried under his name yet doubted, this one since antiquity, where it was sometimes assigned to other hands. The conclusion is Socratic in flavour, but the reasoning is thought too weak to be his. Reading it means reading a skilled imitation, an instance of how a great name gathers forgeries around it.

What does it mean that wealth is good "by convention"?

It turns on the Greek contrast between nomos (convention) and physis (nature): money has value only because people agree to accept it, not because it is good in its own nature. Coin feeds no one directly. So wealth is at best instrumentally good, and only for someone who knows how to use it well — which shifts the real good toward knowledge, away from the money itself.

Why does the argument make knowledge the true wealth?

Because a possession counts as wealth only when it is useful, and things are useful only to someone who knows how to use them — a flute to a player, a tool to a craftsman. Lacking that knowledge, riches sit idle or do harm. So the genuinely valuable thing is the expertise that puts goods to work, never the heap of goods on its own.

By what measure does the dialogue decide who is rich?

Not by how much one owns but by the ratio of what one has to what one wants. A person of modest means and few desires is richer than a magnate consumed by craving, because wealth is simply having enough for one's needs. On this measure boundless desire keeps even the greatest fortune perpetually short, and mere accumulation never closes the gap.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Whether Wealth Is Good

Is money genuinely worth chasing, or good only by convention? The paradoxical answer: the richest, forever wanting more, may be the most wretched of all.

Socrates works with Eryxias, Critias and young Erasistratus toward the conclusion that wealth has only conventional value and that endless acquisitiveness is a kind of misery — a recognisably Socratic result reached by unconvincing means. On that execution scholars judge the piece not Plato's; it is classed among the spurious works, doubted since antiquity and sometimes assigned to other hands. It comes down whole in the corpus all the same, one of the imitations a famous name gathers around it, and among the least likely on the shelf to be genuinely his.

  • wealth
  • value
  • virtue
  • ethics
  • desire
  • money
  • usefulness
  • wisdom

Within this work

passages held
24
distinct concepts
58
by passages held, corpus-wide
#265

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: utility with wealth.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 12 pairings. 31 shared passages in all. 4 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
utilitywealth7
virtuewealth3
wealthwisdom3
causalityutility2
charactervirtue2
characterwealth2
definitionutility2
definitionwealth2
ethicsvirtue2
ethicswealth2
utilityvirtue2
virtuewisdom2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας) you are here GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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