WorkPlato

First Alcibiades

For centuries the first dialogue a student of Plato was handed — though scholars have doubted since the 1800s whether Plato wrote it at all.

by Plato61 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ
First published
390 BCE(aged 38)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

The Neoplatonists — Iamblichus, and later Proclus — placed this dialogue at the head of the whole course of study, the doorway to everything else Plato wrote; for the better part of a thousand years it was the first a student was given to read, and in antiquity no one questioned that he had written it. The dialogue earns the role by its subject. Socrates approaches the young Alcibiades just as the brilliant, ambitious youth is about to throw himself into public life, and presses one demand ahead of all his plans: know yourself. Before you can govern others you must know what justice is; before that, you must know what the self is that would do the knowing — not the body, Socrates argues, but the soul. The whole conversation is a training in self-examination as the precondition of power. Then, in the early nineteenth century, the German scholar Friedrich Schleiermacher rejected it as un-Platonic, and its standing collapsed. Authenticity has been disputed ever since, though stylometric analysis points toward Plato and some scholars have recently defended it — and that uncertainty is now the most important thing to know about it. It survives whole with the corpus, and remains the tradition's plainest single working-out of the old command carved at Delphi, to know oneself.

Key concepts

Who is Alcibiades, and why does Socrates approach him?

A brilliant, wealthy and intensely ambitious young Athenian on the verge of entering public life; historically he became one of the city's most dazzling and destructive politician-generals. Socrates catches him before he launches himself at power and presses a prior demand: know yourself first. The dialogue is a training in self-examination staged at exactly that threshold.

What is the 'know thyself' the dialogue keeps returning to?

The command gnothi seauton, carved at the temple of Delphi. This dialogue is the tradition's plainest working-out of it: before governing others you must know what justice is, and before that, what the self is that would know, the soul, Socrates argues, not the body. Self-knowledge becomes the precondition of any right to rule.

Why is the First Alcibiades' authenticity so disputed?

Because scholarly opinion reversed. In antiquity no one doubted Plato wrote it, and the Neoplatonists made it the first dialogue students read. Then in the early nineteenth century Schleiermacher rejected it as un-Platonic, and its standing collapsed. Stylometric analysis now leans back toward Plato, and some scholars defend it, but the uncertainty itself is the salient fact about it.

Why was this once the first Plato dialogue students read?

The Neoplatonists, Iamblichus then Proclus, placed it at the head of the whole curriculum, treating it as the doorway to everything else Plato wrote. For roughly a thousand years it was the beginner's text, chosen because its subject, self-knowledge as the ground of all learning and rule, was seen as where philosophical education must start.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Know Yourself Before You Rule

Can an ambitious young man be fit to govern others when he cannot yet say what justice is, or even what the self that would rule really is?

Catching Alcibiades on the verge of public life, Socrates halts every plan with the command carved at Delphi: know yourself. Before governing others you must know justice; before that, know what the self is — not the body, he argues, but the soul. The whole exchange trains self-examination as the precondition of power, which is why the Neoplatonists made it the first dialogue a student read. Its authenticity, unquestioned in antiquity, has been disputed since Schleiermacher — and that uncertainty is now the salient fact about it.

  • self-knowledge
  • virtue
  • expertise
  • ethics
  • justice
  • education
  • ignorance
  • politics
  • leadership
  • soul
  • power
  • self-care
  • governance
  • knowledge
  • political philosophy
  • agreement
  • expediency
  • personal identity

Within this work

passages held
61
distinct concepts
122
by passages held, corpus-wide
#222

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: axiology with ethics.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 10 pairings. 25 shared passages in all. 16 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
axiologyethics3
epistemologyexpertise3
epistemologyignorance3
epistemologyself-knowledge3
ignoranceself-knowledge3
axiologyvirtue2
educationepistemology2
ethicsvirtue2
expertisevirtue2
self-knowledgevirtue2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ) you are here GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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