WorkPlato

Phaedrus

Love, rhetoric, and the soul as a winged chariot — closing with Socrates' strange warning that writing itself may weaken the mind.

by Plato487 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
  • Greek, a translation held here
Original title
Φαῖδρος
First published
370 BCE(aged 58)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

Almost alone among the dialogues, this one leaves the city. Socrates walks out beyond the walls of Athens, wading barefoot in a stream under a plane tree, with young Phaedrus, who has a written speech he is desperate to try out. The speech, by the orator Lysias, argues coolly that a boy should prefer a suitor who does not love him. Socrates first outdoes it, then recants in a great palinode praising love as a kind of divine madness — and paints the soul as a charioteer driving two winged horses, one noble and one unruly, its wings growing back at the sight of beauty as it remembers the Forms it once glimpsed. The dialogue then turns unexpectedly practical, asking what real rhetoric would be: not a bag of tricks but a true art of leading souls, grounded in knowledge and dialectic. It ends with a myth about the Egyptian god who invented writing, and Socrates' worry that written words, unable to answer a question or defend themselves, weaken living memory and only seem to teach. That passage on writing as a pharmakon — remedy and poison at once — became one of the most analysed in all of Plato, not least in Jacques Derrida's twentieth-century reading of it. It survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

What is the palinode, and why does Socrates recant?

A palinode is a recantation-song. Having just given a speech condemning love as harmful, Socrates fears he has blasphemed against Erôs, a god, and delivers a second speech taking it all back. This palinode praises love as divine madness and unfolds the soul's chariot and the recollection of the Forms. The dialogue's whole positive vision of love is a retraction of its own opening.

What are the four kinds of divine madness?

Socrates marks off four god-given manias from ordinary derangement: the prophetic madness of Apollo, the ritual or purificatory madness of Dionysus, the poetic madness of the Muses, and the erotic madness of Erôs — the highest. Each is a blessing that surpasses sober self-possession. The claim overturns the opening assumption that the calm, unloving suitor is the safer choice.

What is the soul's chariot, and why do its wings regrow?

The soul is a charioteer driving two winged horses, one noble, one unruly. Once it followed the gods and glimpsed the Forms; fallen and embodied, it lost its wings. The sight of earthly beauty recalls Beauty itself, and the wings begin, painfully, to grow back. Love is this reawakening — beauty being the one Form whose earthly image is vivid enough to stir the ascent.

What is psychagogia, the true art of rhetoric?

Real rhetoric is psychagogia, a "leading of souls": to persuade rightly one must know both the truth of the matter and the particular kind of soul being addressed, fitting speech to hearer. It rests on dialectic — the twin methods of collection, gathering particulars under one Form, and division, cutting a kind at its natural joints. Lacking that knowledge, oratory is mere knack.

What do the Theuth myth and the pharmakon say about writing?

In the closing myth the Egyptian god Theuth offers King Thamus writing as a cure for forgetting; Thamus replies it will breed forgetfulness instead, giving the appearance of wisdom without the reality. Writing is a pharmakon — remedy and poison at once. Fixed words cannot answer questions or defend themselves, so living dialectic planted in the soul outranks anything written down.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

Speech as the Leading of Souls

Can persuasion ever be an art rather than a bag of tricks? Only, Plato answers, when the speaker knows both the truth and the soul he is trying to lead.

Socrates first out-argues a cool speech against love, then recants in the palinode praising love as a divine madness and painting the soul as a charioteer whose wings regrow at the sight of beauty, remembering the Forms. From there the dialogue turns practical: real rhetoric is grounded in dialectic and knowledge of its listener, not manipulation. It closes with the myth of writing as pharmakon — remedy and poison at once — warning that written words, unable to answer back, only seem to teach. Derrida's famous reading returns to that passage.

  • rhetoric
  • persuasion
  • truth
  • communication
  • love
  • soul
  • wisdom
  • knowledge
  • manipulation

Within this work

passages held
487
distinct concepts
525
by passages held, corpus-wide
#70

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: persuasion with rhetoric.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 16 pairings. 367 shared passages in all. 84 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
persuasionrhetoric65
rhetorictruth57
communicationrhetoric46
persuasiontruth35
communicationpersuasion33
communicationtruth27
critical thinkingrhetoric18
desirelove18
communicationpsychology10
persuasionpsychology10
psychologyrhetoric10
communicationcritical thinking9
critical thinkingtruth9
desirepsychology8
critical thinkingpersuasion7
lovetruth5

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος) you are here GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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