WorkPlato

Statesman

The sequel to the Sophist asks what real political skill is — and answers that the true statesman's knowledge stands above even the written law.

by Plato90 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Πολιτικός
First published
360 BCE(aged 68)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

Picking up the very next day from the Sophist, with the same Eleatic visitor now leading a different young partner, the dialogue hunts a new quarry: the statesman, and the knowledge that would make someone genuinely fit to rule. The method is again division, carving the field of expertise downward, and along the way come two of Plato's memorable set-pieces — a great myth of a cosmos that periodically reverses its spin, time running backward in a lost golden age under Cronus, and the image of statecraft as weaving, binding the brave and the gentle temperaments of a city's people into one strong cloth. The hard conclusion is that true political skill is a kind of expert knowledge, and that a real knower could rightly rule even against the written laws — laws being only crude general rules, second-best stand-ins for the judgement of someone who actually understands. Where no such expert exists, though, strict obedience to law becomes the safest course, and the constitutions are ranked accordingly. A late work bridging the metaphysics of the Sophist and the detailed legislation of the Laws, it tempers the Republic's confidence in rule above law, and it survives whole with the corpus.

Key concepts

What is the myth of the reversing cosmos?

The Stranger tells of two great ages. In one the god himself steers the universe; then he lets go, and the cosmos reverses its spin — time runs backward, the dead rise young, humans are born from the earth and age in reverse, under Cronus. When the helm is released, disorder grows until the god takes it again. The myth frames our present age as one abandoned to its own motion, needing human governance.

How does the myth correct the "shepherd-king" definition?

An early division defined the statesman as a herdsman of the human flock, a divine shepherd tending sheep. The myth exposes the flaw: that total care belonged to the god of the earlier age, not to any human ruler now. Today's king is no being of another kind set above his flock, but a fellow human and caretaker — so the definition must be recut.

What is the doctrine of due measure (to metrion)?

The Stranger distinguishes two kinds of measurement: measuring things against each other — larger, smaller — and measuring them against the due measure, the fitting amount for the purpose. Every art, statecraft included, depends on this second kind. Excess and deficiency are judged not relatively but against a standard of what is fitting. Without the due measure, no craft and no science could exist at all.

How does the dialogue rank the constitutions?

By two cuts: how many rule — one, few, many — and whether they rule with or against law, yielding six forms. Among the law-abiding, monarchy is best, then aristocracy, then lawful democracy; among the lawless the order reverses, lawless democracy least bad, oligarchy worse, tyranny worst. All six fall short of the one true constitution: rule by genuine expert knowledge.

What are the divine and human bonds in the weaving?

Statecraft weaves two opposed temperaments — the brave and the gentle — into one civic cloth, since each alone degenerates. It binds them by a "divine bond," a shared true conviction about what is noble instilled through education, and a "human bond," intermarriage that mixes the two natures across generations. The ruler's art is this joining of contrary characters into a stable, unified people.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

The Statesman's Knowledge

What makes someone genuinely fit to rule? Expert knowledge, Plato answers — a knowing so real it could rightly govern even against the written law.

The Eleatic Stranger hunts the statesman by division, and along the way gives the myth of a cosmos that periodically reverses its spin and the image of statecraft as weaving the brave and gentle temperaments into one cloth. True political skill is expert knowledge; laws are only crude general rules, second-best stand-ins for a real knower's judgement. Yet where no such expert exists, strict obedience to law becomes safest, and the constitutions are ranked accordingly. Bridging the Sophist and the Laws, it tempers the Republic's confidence in rule set above law.

  • political philosophy
  • governance
  • statesmanship
  • expertise
  • authority
  • methodology
  • classification
  • leadership
  • definition
  • law

Within this work

passages held
90
distinct concepts
132
by passages held, corpus-wide
#191

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: classification with methodology.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 15 pairings. 57 shared passages in all. 33 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
classificationmethodology7
dialecticmethodology7
governancepolitical philosophy7
classificationdialectic4
classificationlogic4
classificationpolitical science4
classificationtaxonomy4
methodologypolitical philosophy4
classificationpolitical philosophy3
logictaxonomy3
dialecticlogic2
governancetaxonomy2
logicmethodology2
methodologypolitical science2
political philosophytaxonomy2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)

    The turning point where Plato subjects the middle-period Forms to their gravest criticism; its baffling second half became, for the Neoplatonists, the supreme metaphysical text in the whole corpus.

    GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός) you are here GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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