WorkPlato

Parmenides

The dialogue where Plato turns his sharpest weapons on his own theory of Forms — then sets a dizzying logical exercise about the One.

by Plato68 passages held

  • English, a translation held here, and your language
Original title
Παρμενίδης
First published
370 BCE(aged 58)
Original language
Ancient Greek

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Overview

Here Plato does something startling: he lets his own central doctrine be taken apart. A very young Socrates meets the aged Parmenides of Elea and his follower Zeno, lays out the theory of Forms, and Parmenides — courteously and devastatingly — shows how little the young man has thought it through. If many things are large by sharing in one Form of Largeness, what exactly relates them to it? The most famous objection, the 'third man,' points to an endless regress of Forms behind Forms. Socrates cannot answer, and most scholars read the meeting as Plato's own invention, a way of confronting his philosophy with its hardest problems. The dialogue's long second half is stranger still: Parmenides drills the boy through eight tightly linked deductions about 'the One' — if it is, and if it is not — that seem to end in flat contradiction, and no one has ever agreed what they are for. The Neoplatonists read them as a hidden map of reality; Plotinus drew on them, Proclus and Damascius wrote full commentaries treating the hypotheses as a theology of the One, and Ficino read it as Plato's profoundest work on the divine. Modern readers more often see a logical exercise, or an honest display of perplexity. It survives whole with the corpus, the most contested thing Plato wrote.

Key concepts

What is participation, and its whole-part dilemma?

Participation is how many things "share in" one Form to have its character — large things share in Largeness. Parmenides presses a dilemma: does each thing get the whole Form, or only a part? If the whole, one Form is present entire in many separate places; if a part, the Form is divided and no longer one. Either way the sharing the middle theory relies on breaks down.

What is the "greatest difficulty" facing the Forms?

If Forms are wholly separate from our world, they are knowable only by Knowledge-itself, which we do not possess — so the Forms would be unknowable to us. Worse, a god with exact knowledge would know the Forms but not human things, and so could not rule us. Parmenides calls this the gravest objection, one only a gifted thinker could ever answer.

What gymnastic method does Parmenides prescribe?

Before deciding anything, train by tracing the full consequences of a hypothesis both ways: what follows for a thing if it is, and if it is not — and not only for it but for everything else in relation to it. Socrates failed, Parmenides says, by fixing the Forms too soon. The dizzying second half is this exercise performed on "the One."

How are the deductions about the One organized?

As linked deductions dividing on two hypotheses — "if the One is" and "if the One is not" — each traced through consequences for the One itself and for the others. Traditionally counted as eight, they reach opposite conclusions that seem to contradict: the One is both like and unlike, at rest and in motion, one and many. What the contradictions prove is the dialogue's deepest puzzle.

How did the Neoplatonists read the second half?

Not as a logical puzzle but as hidden theology. Plotinus drew the One beyond being from the first hypothesis; Proclus and Damascius wrote full commentaries treating the deductions as a map of divine reality descending from the One; Ficino called Parmenides Plato's profoundest work. Modern readers more often see a logical exercise, or honest perplexity — the reading has never been settled.

Themes of the book

What this book returns to, gathered into themes and ordered by how much of the text each one occupies.

The Theory of Forms on Trial

If many things are large by sharing one Form of Largeness, what actually links them to it? Plato hands his own central doctrine to its sharpest critic and lets it be taken apart.

The aged Parmenides shows young Socrates how little he has thought the Forms through — most damagingly the 'third man,' the endless regress of Forms behind Forms that participation seems to demand. Socrates cannot answer. The long second half then drills eight deductions about 'the One' — if it is, and if it is not — that end in apparent contradiction no one has agreed how to read. The Neoplatonists took them as a hidden theology of the divine; moderns as logic, or honest perplexity. It is the turning point where Plato confronts his metaphysics with its gravest problems.

  • metaphysics
  • unity
  • ontology
  • participation
  • forms
  • plurality
  • contradiction
  • time
  • being

Within this work

passages held
68
distinct concepts
98
by passages held, corpus-wide
#211

What this book thinks together

Every arc around the wheel is one concept in this book. A ribbon joins two the text reaches for together, and its width is how many of its passages hold both. Strongest: metaphysics with unity.
Concept co-occurrence, strongest first 8 concepts, joined by 16 pairings. 62 shared passages in all. 40 weaker pairings reach beyond these concepts and are not drawn.
ConceptPaired conceptShared passages
metaphysicsunity10
metaphysicsmotion6
ideasmetaphysics5
identitymetaphysics5
ontologyunity5
metaphysicsparticipation4
participationunity4
ideasparticipation3
ideasunity3
identityparticipation3
metaphysicsontology3
metaphysicstemporality3
identityontology2
identityunity2
ontologyparticipation2
ontologytemporality2

Works held

The author's work in order, this book marked in place. Your-language title first, the original beneath it where the two differ; side chips show which full texts are held.

  1. -399 Apology (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους)

    Alone among Plato's works it is a courtroom monologue rather than a dialogue, and with the Euthyphro, Crito and Phaedo it forms the quartet dramatising Socrates' trial and death — the events that turned Plato toward philosophy.

    GRCELEN
  2. -399 Crito (Κρίτων)

    Set in the prison between the Apology's verdict and the Phaedo's execution, it is the shortest of the four last-days dialogues and the one that turns from Socrates' own fate to the citizen's duty toward the state.

    GRCEN
  3. -399 Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)

    One of the short definitional dialogues, in which Socrates hunts a single concept — here holiness — and comes away empty-handed; it opens the tetralogy that runs through the trial to the execution.

    GRCEN
  4. -399 Lesser Hippias (Ἱππίας ἐλάττων)

    A brief, aporetic early piece whose deliberately perverse conclusion has kept it a standing puzzle — and whose authenticity a few scholars still question, though Aristotle already treated it as Plato's.

    GRCEN
  5. -395 Ion (Ἴων)

    Among the shortest dialogues, and the first place Plato treats poetry as divine possession rather than craft — a theme he takes up again, far more harshly, in the Republic's quarrel with the poets.

    GRCEN
  6. -390 First Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Αʹ)

    Its authenticity is disputed — unquestioned in antiquity, doubted since Schleiermacher — which is now the salient fact about it; the longer of the two Alcibiades dialogues attached to Plato's name.

    GRCEN
  7. -390 Laches (Λάχης)

    An early inquiry into a single virtue, pairing naturally with the Charmides on temperance; the question it leaves open — whether courage is really a form of knowledge — points ahead to the Protagoras.

    GRCEN
  8. -390 Second Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης Βʹ)

    Generally judged spurious — a post-Platonic imitation carried under his name in the corpus — this short exercise on prayer is useful mainly as a specimen of how the school later wrote in Plato's manner.

    GRCEN
  9. -385 Meno (Μένων)

    A pivot in the corpus, standing between the aporetic early dialogues and the middle-period metaphysics: the theory of recollection and the knowledge/true-belief distinction first surface here, on the road to the Phaedo and Republic.

    GRCELEN
  10. -385 Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

    Plato's fullest dramatic contest between Socratic questioning and sophistic display, staged among the age's leading intellectuals; its question of teachable virtue passes straight into the Meno and Gorgias.

    GRCELEN
  11. -384 Euthydemus (Εὐθύδημος)

    A comic dialogue framed as Socrates' report to Crito, and the corpus's fullest exhibition of sophistical fallacy — much the same material Aristotle would later systematise in the Sophistical Refutations.

    GRCEN
  12. -380 Charmides (Χαρμίδης)

    The early companion to the Laches: where that dialogue fails to pin down courage, this one fails to pin down temperance — set just after Socrates' return from Potidaea, among relatives of Plato who became tyrants.

    GRCEN
  13. -380 Cratylus (Κρατύλος)

    Plato's only dialogue given wholly to language and the correctness of names; hard to date and unusual in the corpus, it stands at the head of a debate the philosophy of language has never closed.

    GRCELEN
  14. -380 Gorgias (Γοργίας)

    The bridge from the early ethical dialogues to the Republic: its confrontation with Callicles over whether injustice pays sets up the question the Republic devotes its whole length to answering.

    GRCEN
  15. -380 Lysis (Λύσις)

    One of the shortest early dialogues, and Plato's only sustained treatment of friendship as such; the questions it cannot answer are the ones Aristotle later organises in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    GRCEN
  16. -380 Menexenus (Μενέξενος)

    Almost entirely a set-piece funeral oration rather than a dialogue; its authenticity is backed by Aristotle's references, and it reads as Plato's deliberately ambiguous parody of Athenian patriotic rhetoric.

    GRCELEN
  17. -375 Phaedo (Φαίδων)

    The longest and most doctrinally ambitious of the last-days group, and the point where Socrates' conversations give way to Plato's own metaphysics: the theory of Forms stated outright, at the deathbed.

    GRCELEN
  18. -375 Republic (Πολιτεία)

    The centre of the corpus and the fullest statement of the middle-period philosophy — the Forms, the tripartite soul, the ideal city — gathering into one work the ethical and political threads of the Gorgias, Meno and Phaedo.

    GRCEN
  19. -375 Symposium (Συμπόσιον)

    A middle-period masterpiece built as a sequence of set speeches rather than a cross-examination; with the Phaedrus it is Plato's great treatment of erôs, and the source, through Ficino, of the phrase 'Platonic love.'

    GRCELEN
  20. -370 Parmenides (Παρμενίδης) you are here GRCEN
  21. -370 Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος)

    Pairs with the Symposium as Plato's second great study of love, but reaches further — into rhetoric, dialectic and a famous closing critique of writing; unusually, it is set in the countryside outside Athens.

    GRCELEN
  22. -369 Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

    Plato's central inquiry into knowledge, and the first of a late trilogy continued in the Sophist and Statesman; famously it reaches no definition at all, ending in deliberate impasse.

    GRCELEN
  23. -360 Critias (Κριτίας)

    An unfinished late dialogue, broken off in mid-sentence and intended as the sequel to the Timaeus; its importance is almost entirely as the ancient origin of the Atlantis story.

    GRCEN
  24. -360 Sophist (Σοφιστής)

    The technical heart of the late trilogy, led by the Eleatic Stranger rather than Socrates; its solution to the puzzle of not-being is Plato's most sustained piece of pure logic and ontology.

    GRCEN
  25. -360 Statesman (Πολιτικός)

    The direct sequel to the Sophist, and the corpus's bridge from late metaphysics toward the legislation of the Laws; its claim that expert knowledge outranks written law reconsiders the Republic.

    GRCEN
  26. -360 Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

    Plato's one work of systematic cosmology, and by far his most influential in the Latin Middle Ages — for centuries the only dialogue available in the West, through Calcidius's partial translation.

    GRCEN
  27. -350 Eryxias (Ἐρυξίας)

    Classed among the spurious works and doubted since antiquity, this short dialogue on wealth is carried in the corpus under Plato's name but is very unlikely to be his.

    GRCEN
  28. -350 Laws (Νόμοι)

    Plato's longest and last dialogue, left unfinished at his death and the only one without Socrates; a practical, law-by-law counterpart to the ideal city of the Republic.

    GRCEN
  29. Philebus (Φίληβος)

    A late and technically demanding dialogue on whether pleasure or wisdom makes a life good; its exact place in the late group is unusually uncertain, and it is Plato's fullest ethics of pleasure.

    GRCELEN
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